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ABSTRACT
Whether absent class members must have standing under Article III has
divided the courts of appeals, with some suggesting that the requirements of
Article III apply only to the named plaintiff. This Essay argues that the class
action procedural device cannot change the fundamental principle that
uninjured persons lack standing to have their claims adjudicated by federal
courts. To hold otherwise would allow Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to
trump a constitutional imperative, in violation of both due process and the
Rules Enabling Act, and would impermissibly expand the jurisdiction of
federal courts in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 82. Before
certifying a class, courts should require the named plaintiff to show that absent
class member standing—like any other element of a claim—can be proven in a
classwide proceeding, and should assess whether proving that absent class
members have standing would entail individualized inquiries that preclude
classwide adjudication.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has recently instructed that “[i]n an era of frequent
litigation [and] class actions, . . . courts must be more careful to insist on the
formal rules of standing, not less so.”1 Yet some courts have done the exact
opposite, suggesting that uninjured plaintiffs can assert claims in federal court
that they could never bring in an individual action simply because their claims
have been aggregated with others through the class action procedural device
created by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Although the courts of appeals
are divided on this issue, the Seventh Circuit, for example, has stated that the
“requirement of standing is satisfied” if “one member of a certified class has a
plausible claim to have suffered damages” and has suggested that it is
“inevitable” that “a class will often include persons who have not been injured
by the defendant’s conduct.”2
This view—that absent class members do not need to satisfy the
“irreducible constitutional minimum” of Article III standing by virtue of the
class action device3—is profoundly flawed and threatens to erode Article III’s
limitations on the judicial power of federal courts. As other courts of appeals,
including the Second and Eighth Circuits, have recognized, absent class
members—like all litigants in federal court—must have Article III standing.4
This Essay argues that the class action procedural device cannot change the
fundamental principle that uninjured persons lack standing to have their claims
adjudicated by federal courts. To hold otherwise would allow Rule 23 to trump
a constitutional imperative, in violation of both due process and the Rules
Enabling Act, which prohibits the federal rules from “abridg[ing], enlarg[ing]
or modify[ing] any substantive right.”5 It would also impermissibly expand the
jurisdiction of federal courts, in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
82, which provides that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “do not extend or
limit the jurisdiction of the district courts or the venue of actions in those
courts.”6 Therefore, because absent class members must have Article III
standing to recover in federal court, a named plaintiff seeking certification of a
1

Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1449 (2011).
Kohen v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co., 571 F.3d 672, 676–77 (7th Cir. 2009).
3 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
4 Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 264 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[N]o class may be certified that
contains members lacking Article III standing.”); accord Halvorson v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 718 F.3d 773,
778 (8th Cir. 2013); Avritt v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co., 615 F.3d 1023, 1034 (8th Cir. 2010).
5 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012).
6 FED. R. CIV. P. 82.
2
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class should be required to establish that absent class member standing—like
any other element of a claim—can be proven in a classwide proceeding. And
courts should not certify classes where determining absent class member
standing entails individualized inquiries that would preclude classwide
adjudication.
I. THE IRREDUCIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL MINIMUM OF ARTICLE III STANDING
“No principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our
system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court
jurisdiction to actual cases and controversies.”7 The standing of a litigant to
invoke the power of a federal court goes to the very heart of separation of
powers principles to ensure that the judicial process is not “used to usurp the
powers of the political branches.”8 Indeed, as the Supreme Court recently
emphasized in Hollingsworth v. Perry, “[t]he Article III requirement that a
party invoking the jurisdiction of a federal court seek relief for a personal,
particularized injury serves vital interests going to the role of the Judiciary in
our system of separated powers.”9
Article III’s standing requirement thus ensures that important legal
questions will not be resolved “in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society,
but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the
consequences of judicial action.”10 That is, by requiring that a litigant have a
“direct stake in the controversy,” Article III’s case or controversy requirement
prevents the federal courts from becoming a forum for the “vindication of the
value interests of concerned bystanders.”11 “Those who do not possess Art. III
standing may not litigate as suitors in the courts of the United States.”12
Therefore, to properly invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts, a
litigant must first allege and then ultimately prove at trial the “three elements”
that comprise “the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing”: (1) an
“injury in fact,” defined as “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is
7 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997)).
8 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013).
9 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2667 (2013).
10 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472
(1982).
11 United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 687
(1973).
12 Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475–76.
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(a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical”; (2) “a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of” that is “fairly traceable” to the actions of the defendant; and
(3) that it is “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable [court] decision.”13 Significantly, the injury required
to establish standing must be “particularized” in that it “must affect the
plaintiff in a personal and individual way.”14
Although the Supreme Court has never squarely addressed whether absent
class members in a certified class action must have Article III standing, it has
emphasized on multiple occasions that the class action procedural device
cannot trump the requirements of Article III. The Court has explained that the
fact “[t]hat a suit may be a class action adds nothing to the question of
standing.”15 And the Court has instructed that “Rule 23’s requirements must be
interpreted in keeping with Article III constraints, and with the Rules Enabling
Act.”16 Further, Rule 23 is also limited by Rule 82’s prohibition on using the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to “extend . . . the jurisdiction of the district
courts.”17
II. THE CONFLICT IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS
Although there is broad agreement among the federal courts that at least
one class representative must have Article III standing to litigate claims on
behalf of a class, the courts of appeals are divided on whether absent class
members also must satisfy Article III.
Both the Second and Eighth Circuits have held that “[i]n order for a class to
be certified, each member must have standing and show an injury in fact that is
traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed in a favorable decision.”18
The leading Second Circuit decision, Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, involved
an appeal filed by two class action plaintiffs who sought to challenge the
13 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
14 Id. at 560 n.1.
15 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,
40 n.20 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
16 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997); accord Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527
U.S. 815, 831 (1999).
17 FED. R. CIV. P. 82; see also Amchem, 521 U.S. at 613.
18 Halvorson v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 718 F.3d 773, 778 (8th Cir. 2013); accord Avritt v. Reliastar Life
Ins. Co., 615 F.3d 1023, 1034 (8th Cir. 2010); Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 264 (2d Cir.
2006).
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certification of a settlement class covering claims of improper and fraudulent
tax counseling.19 The objecting class members asserted that the settlement
class contained members for whom tax penalties had not yet been assessed,
and who therefore lacked Article III standing.20 The Second Circuit held that
although class members need not “submit evidence of personal standing,” “no
class may be certified that contains members lacking Article III standing”;
therefore, “[t]he class must . . . be defined in such a way that anyone within it
would have standing.”21 Suggesting that this conclusion was settled law, the
Second Circuit did not engage in any detailed analysis and instead cited a
handful of cases and treatises, none of which squarely address or resolve the
issue.22 For example, Denney relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp.,23 a case in which the Court noted, but did not decide, the
question whether Article III applies to absent class members.24
The Eighth Circuit in Avritt v. Reliastar Life Insurance Co. subsequently
adopted, also without much analysis, the Second Circuit’s views.25 In Avritt,
the district court denied class certification in part because it found that whether
the defendant had actually misled the putative class members about its
interest-crediting practices and whether the putative class member relied upon
any such misrepresentations could not be determined on a classwide basis.26
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the court erred in concluding that they
were required to show that absent class members had suffered an injury
because they claimed that California’s Unfair Competition Law allows absent
class members to bring claims in a class action regardless of whether they have
suffered an injury.27 The Eighth Circuit reasoned that to the extent California
law allows “a single injured plaintiff [to] bring a class action on behalf of a
group of individuals who may not have had a cause of action themselves, it is
inconsistent with the doctrine of standing as applied by federal courts.”28 The
court noted that “[t]he ‘irreducible constitutional minimum of standing requires
a showing of injury in fact to the plaintiff that is fairly traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant, and likely to be redressed by a favorable
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Denney, 443 F.3d at 259.
Id.
Id. at 263–64.
See id.
Id. at 264.
See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 830–31 (1999).
615 F.3d 1023, 1034 (8th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1026.
Id. at 1033 (citing In re Tobacco II Cases, 207 P.3d 20, 31–32 (Cal. 2009)).
Id. at 1034.
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decision.’”29 And, relying on Denney, the court explained that “[t]he
constitutional requirement of standing is equally applicable to class actions”
and held that “a class cannot be certified if it contains members who lack
standing.”30
The Ninth Circuit followed Denney in a recent decision, holding that “no
class may be certified that contains members lacking Article III standing.”31 In
previous decisions, however, the Ninth Circuit had suggested that only named
plaintiffs must have Article III standing.32 Yet none of these Ninth Circuit
decisions contain a reasoned discussion of the issue.
Recently, the District of Columbia Circuit strongly suggested that absent
class members must have Article III standing. In In re Rail Freight Fuel
Surcharge Antitrust Litigation, the court held that to satisfy the predominance
requirement of Rule 23, plaintiffs are required to “show that they can prove,
through common evidence, that all class members were in fact injured by the
alleged conspiracy.”33 The court further noted that it “expect[ed] the common
evidence to show all class members suffered some injury.”34 The court also
reasoned that if a model submitted by the plaintiffs’ expert could not
accurately show that all class members were injured by the allegedly wrongful
conduct, that fact would “shred the plaintiffs’ case for certification” because
“[c]ommon questions of fact cannot predominate where there exists no reliable
means of proving classwide injury in fact.”35 Although the District of
Columbia Circuit did not expressly mention Article III standing in In re Rail
Freight, its repeated statements that the plaintiffs were required to show that all
29

Id. (quoting Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 591 (8th Cir. 2009)).
Id. (citing Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 263–64 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also id. (“[T]o put
it another way, a named plaintiff cannot represent a class of persons who lack the ability to bring a suit
themselves.”). The Eighth Circuit recently reaffirmed its adoption of Denney’s view of absent class member
standing in Halvorson v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co., 718 F.3d 773, 778–79 (8th Cir. 2013).
31 See Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 594 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Denney, 443 F.3d at
264) (internal quotation marks omitted).
32 See Stearns v. Ticketmaster Corp., 655 F.3d 1013, 1021 (9th Cir. 2011) (claiming that, with respect to
“standing under Article III,” Ninth Circuit “law keys on the representative party, not all of the class members,
and has done so for many years”); see also Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir.
2007) (en banc) (“[W]e consider only whether at least one named plaintiff satisfies the standing
requirements . . . .”). At least one district court in the Ninth Circuit, however, has concluded that neither Bates
nor Stearns “resolve[d] the question of whether all members of a class must satisfy Article III requirements.”
See O’Shea v. Epson Am., Inc., No. CV 09-8063 PSG (CWx), 2011 WL 4352458, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 19,
2011).
33 725 F.3d 244, 252 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (emphasis added).
34 Id.
35 Id. at 252–53.
30
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class members had suffered an injury suggests that the court believed that
absent class members must have Article III standing.
The leading case on the other side of the circuit split is the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in Kohen v. Pacific Investment Management Co., where the
court noted that “one named plaintiff with standing . . . is all that is
necessary.”36 In Kohen, the defendants appealed an order certifying a class of
plaintiffs who purchased certain futures contracts.37 The plaintiffs alleged that
the defendants had violated section 9(a) of the Commodity Exchange Act by
cornering the futures market for certain U.S. Treasury notes.38 The defendants
argued that some putative class members lacked Article III standing because
the class definition potentially included persons who would not have lost
money on their futures contract if they had hedged their potential losses.39
Addressing the Article III question, the Seventh Circuit explained that “as
long as one member of a certified class has a plausible claim to have suffered
damages, the requirement of standing is satisfied.”40 But the primary authority
the court cited for this “one member” standing rule—the Supreme Court’s
decision in United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty41—does not support
the court’s conclusion. Geraghty dealt with an unrelated question regarding
whether a putative class action is rendered moot where class certification has
been denied and the named plaintiff’s claim has been mooted.42 Kohen also
cited a previous Seventh Circuit decision, but that case involved the same
mootness issue addressed in Geraghty, not whether absent class members must
have Article III standing.43
The Seventh Circuit in Kohen attempted to distinguish the Second Circuit’s
decision in Denney as a case that “focus[ed] on the class definition” and
merely prohibited a class definition from being “so broad that it sweeps within
it persons who could not have been injured by the defendant’s conduct.”44 Of
course, this ignores Denney’s square holding that “no class may be certified

36

571 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 674.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 676.
40 Id.
41 445 U.S. 388 (1980).
42 Id. at 404 (holding “that an action brought on behalf of a class does not become moot upon expiration
of the named plaintiff’s substantive claim, even though class certification has been denied”).
43 See Wiesmueller v. Kosobucki, 513 F.3d 784, 785–86 (7th Cir. 2008).
44 Kohen, 571 F.3d at 677.
37
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that contains members lacking Article III standing,”45 which cannot be
reconciled with Kohen’s statement that “as long as one member of a certified
class has a plausible claim to have suffered damages, the requirement of
standing is satisfied.”46
Relying on Kohen, the Tenth Circuit subsequently stated in DG ex rel.
Stricklin v. Devaughn that “Rule 23’s certification requirements neither require
all class members to suffer harm or threat of immediate harm nor Named
Plaintiffs to prove class members have suffered such harm.”47 According to the
court, “[t]hat a class possibly or even likely includes persons unharmed by a
defendant’s conduct should not preclude certification.”48 But like the Seventh
Circuit in Kohen, the court in Stricklin did not provide any explanation for why
plaintiffs who have not suffered any injury should be allowed to have their
claims adjudicated by a federal court.
The Third Circuit in Krell v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America also
adopted the view that absent class members need not have standing under
Article III.49 In Krell, the district court certified a settlement class, and several
class members who objected to the settlement appealed, arguing that the class
contained uninjured persons who lacked Article III standing because they had
not suffered an injury in fact.50 Without much discussion, the Third Circuit
rejected this argument and noted that “whether an action presents a ‘case or
controversy’ under Article III is determined vis-a-vis the named parties.”51 The
court further explained that “[o]nce [the] threshold individual standing by the
class representative is met, a proper party to raise a particular issue is before
the court, and there remains no further separate class standing requirement in
the constitutional sense.”52

45

Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 264 (2d Cir. 2006).
Kohen, 571 F.3d at 676.
47 594 F.3d 1188, 1198 (10th Cir. 2010).
48 Id. at 1201 (citing Kohen, 571 F.3d at 677).
49 Krell v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. (In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig.), 148 F.3d
283, 306–07 (3d Cir. 1998).
50 Id. at 306.
51 Id. (citation omitted).
52 Id. at 306–07 (quoting 1 HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 2.05
(3d ed. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
46
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III. ABSENT CLASS MEMBERS MUST HAVE ARTICLE III STANDING
Although the courts of appeals are divided regarding whether absent class
members must satisfy Article III, none of them truly have grappled with the
issue or reasoned from first principles. The fact that these courts have issued
conflicting rulings may be the result of a failure to assess the interplay between
Article III and the class action procedural device. Tellingly, those courts and
commentators endorsing the view that absent class members need not have
Article III standing have generally emphasized policy concerns over doctrine.53
When the issue is examined in light of the proper function of procedural rules,
and the fact that they cannot modify the substantive law or expand the
jurisdiction of federal courts, it becomes clear that Rule 23 cannot be used to
subvert the fundamental requirements of Article III.
It is beyond dispute that if an absent class member were to bring a lawsuit
in an individual capacity in federal court, he would have to satisfy Article III.
Thus, in an individual suit, an absent class member would be obligated first to
sufficiently allege, and then prove at trial, that he suffered an injury that
affected him “in a personal and individual way”54 and could not rely on the
fact that others may have suffered an injury. As the Supreme Court has held,
for a plaintiff to have standing under Article III, he “must assert his own legal
rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or
interests of third parties.”55 This obligation continues at each stage of the
litigation.56
This constitutional prerequisite cannot be altered or eliminated merely
because a person’s claims are aggregated with others in a class action certified
under Rule 23 rather than brought in an individual action. As the Supreme
Court held in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, “the Rules Enabling Act forbids
interpreting Rule 23 to ‘abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.’”57
53 See, e.g., Kohen, 571 F.3d at 677 (emphasizing that it “is almost inevitable” that “a class will often
include persons who have not been injured by the defendant’s conduct”); Joshua P. Davis, Eric L. Cramer, &
Caitlin V. May, The Puzzle of Class Actions with Uninjured Members, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 858, 860 (2014)
(“Certifying classes containing uninjured members . . . makes sound policy sense.”).
54 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1 (1992); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
501 (1975) (“[T]he plaintiff . . . must allege a distinct and palpable injury to himself . . . .”).
55 Warth, 422 U.S. at 499.
56 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (explaining that the elements of standing are “not mere pleading requirements”
and “must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of
proof . . . at the successive stages of the litigation”).
57 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006) (currently codified as 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072(b) (2012))).
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But construing Rule 23 to authorize federal courts to resolve the claims of
absent class members, regardless whether those class members personally have
suffered an injury sufficient to establish standing, would exempt uninjured
plaintiffs from the requirements of Article III and enlarge their right to pursue
claims in federal court. Relatedly, because “a class cannot be certified on the
premise that [the defendant] will not be entitled to litigate its statutory defenses
to individual claims,”58 and because “[d]ue process requires that there be an
opportunity to present every available defense,”59 defendants’ right to
challenge the standing of uninjured plaintiffs cannot be abridged merely
because their claims are aggregated in a certified class action.
In short, granting absent class members a special exemption from Article
III that would not apply in an individual suit runs afoul of the Supreme Court’s
teaching that “Rule 23’s requirements must be interpreted in keeping with
Article III constraints, and with the Rules Enabling Act, which instructs that
rules of procedure ‘shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right.’”60 Similarly, relieving absent class members of their obligation to
establish Article III standing also would impermissibly expand the jurisdiction
of federal courts beyond Article III’s constitutional limitations, in clear
violation of Rule 82, which provides that the federal rules “do not extend or
limit the jurisdiction of the district courts or the venue of actions in those
courts.”61
Moreover, “[a]n Article III case or controversy is one where all parties
have standing,”62 and while absent class members, by definition, are not named
as parties to the litigation, once a class has been certified, they can and should
be considered parties for purposes of Article III because a federal court will
58

Id.
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972) (quoting Am. Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 168
(1932)) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2007);
Duran v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 325 P.3d 916, 935 (Cal. 2014).
60 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1994)
(currently codified as 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012))).
61 FED. R. CIV. P. 82; see also Amchem, 521 U.S. at 613 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 82); Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 94 (1968) (“The jurisdiction of federal courts is defined and limited by Article III of the
Constitution.”).
62 Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1300 (8th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added). Although some courts have
suggested that Article III does not require that all parties to a litigation have standing, “[t]he Supreme Court
has made it very clear that ‘those who do not possess Art. III standing may not litigate as suitors in the courts
of the United States.’” Id. (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475–76 (1982)); see also Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2667 (2013)
(noting that “Article III require[s] that a party invoking the jurisdiction of a federal court” have “a personal,
particularized injury”).
59
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adjudicate their claims, and thus they effectively will be “suitors in the courts
of the United States.”63 In Devlin v. Scardelletti, the Supreme Court rejected
the proposition that absent class members can never be considered parties and
held that “nonnamed class members” are “considered parties for the purposes
of bringing an appeal” of a challenge to a class settlement.64 The Court
explained that “[n]onnamed class members . . . may be parties for some
purposes and not for others” and noted that the “label ‘party’ does not indicate
an absolute characteristic, but rather a conclusion about the applicability of
various procedural rules that may differ based on context.”65 Significantly, the
Court rejected Justice Scalia’s view that parties to the suit are limited to those
class members “named in the complaint” and “those who intervene or
otherwise enter through third-party practice.”66 Devlin’s core holding—that
absent members of a certified class can be parties in some circumstances—was
recently reaffirmed in Smith v. Bayer Corp., where the Supreme Court
emphasized that putative absent class members are not parties before class
certification, or where certification has been denied.67
Devlin thus makes clear that absent class members can be considered
parties after a class is certified for procedural purposes (such as appealing an
adverse judgment and tolling of the statute of limitations).68 It follows that
absent class members should—indeed, must—be considered parties for
purposes of the constitutional requirement of Article III standing. While the
Court in Devlin noted that determining whether absent class members are
parties might hinge on “the goals of class action litigation,”69 the goals of a
procedural device cannot alter constitutional requirements.70 To ignore absent
class members for standing purposes, on the formalistic ground that they are
not named parties to the litigation, would ignore the fact that a certified class
63
64
65
66
67

Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 476.
536 U.S. 1, 9 (2002).
Id. at 9–10.
Id. at 15 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
131 S. Ct. 2368, 2379 (2011); see also Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345, 1349

(2013).
68

See Devlin, 536 U.S. at 9–10.
Id. at 10.
70 The Court in Devlin noted that if absent class members were considered parties for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction, that “would destroy diversity in almost all class actions” because “of the complete
diversity requirement in suits under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.” Id. at 9–10. But “[i]t is settled that complete diversity
is not a constitutional requirement.” Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 n.13 (1978).
And there is no reason to believe that requiring class members to establish Article III standing—i.e., to show
that they have suffered some particularized injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct—would destroy
federal jurisdiction “in almost all class actions.” Devlin, 536 U.S. at 10.
69
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action transforms absent class members into “suitors in the courts of the United
States” who must, like any other party whose claims will be adjudicated in
federal court, “possess Art. III standing.”71 Any other conclusion would allow
Rule 23 to impermissibly expand the power of federal courts far beyond that
which Article III contemplates.
IV. INCORPORATING ARTICLE III INTO THE CLASS CERTIFICATION CALCULUS
As established above, the fact that absent class members’ claims are
brought before a court through the procedural mechanism of a class action
does not eliminate or modify their obligation to satisfy Article III. As a result,
courts must consider at the class certification stage whether the named plaintiff
will be able to prove, in a classwide proceeding, that the absent members
possess standing to have their claims adjudicated in federal court. In other
words, when considering whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met, courts
should treat the elements of Article III standing like the elements of the
underlying substantive causes of action and take them into account in the Rule
23 analysis.
“The class action is ‘an exception to the usual rule that litigation is
conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.’”72 “In order
to justify a departure from that rule, ‘a class representative must be part of the
class and possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class
members.’”73 The requirements of Rule 23(a)—“numerosity, commonality,
typicality, and adequate representation”—“ensure[] that the named plaintiffs
are appropriate representatives of the class whose claims they wish to
litigate.”74
As the Supreme Court has explained, “[w]hat matters to class
certification . . . [is] the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate
common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.”75 To that end,
the commonality requirement demands that the named plaintiff prove that the
claims of the proposed class “depend on a common contention” that is
71 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,
475–76 (1982).
72 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550 (2011) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S.
682, 700–01 (1979)).
73 Id. (quoting E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977)).
74 Id.
75 Id. at 2551 (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 132 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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“capable of classwide resolution” in that “determination of its truth or falsity
will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in
one stroke.”76 And where damages are sought, Rule 23(b)(3)’s “even more
demanding” predominance requirement “requires a court to find that ‘the
questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members.’”77 Where individual questions
are unmanageable and “overwhelm questions common to the class,”
certification should be denied.78
The “class determination generally involves considerations that are
enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s cause of
action.”79 Thus, when considering whether Rule 23’s requirements, including
commonality, typicality, and predominance, are satisfied, courts must “conduct
a ‘rigorous analysis’” that “includ[es] an ‘examination of what the parties
would be required to prove at trial.’”80 Therefore, necessarily included among
the things a plaintiff must prove at trial are the three elements of Article III
standing—injury in fact, fair traceability, and redressability.81
The Supreme Court made clear in Lujan that the elements of Article III
standing “are not mere pleading requirements but rather an indispensable part
of the plaintiff’s case.”82 As a case progresses, “each element must be
supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the
burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the

76 Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2) (requiring showing that “there are questions of law or fact
common to the class”).
77 Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)).
78 Id. at 1433; cf. Duran v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 325 P.3d 916, 932 (Cal. 2014) (“Trial courts also have
the obligation to decertify a class action if individual issues prove unmanageable.”).
79 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2552 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982))
(internal quotation marks omitted); accord Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432.
80 In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prods. Liab. Litig., 644 F.3d 604, 611 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Avritt v.
Reliastar Life Ins. Co., 615 F.3d 1023, 1029 (8th Cir. 2010)); see also Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton
Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184 (2011) (“Considering whether ‘questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate’ begins, of course, with the elements of the underlying cause of action.” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P.
23(b)(3))); Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 676 (9th Cir. 2014) (“In this case, as in all class actions,
commonality cannot be determined without a precise understanding of the nature of the underlying claims.”);
Funeral Consumers Alliance, Inc. v. Serv. Corp. Int’l, 695 F.3d 330, 348 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that a district
court correctly began its “analysis by laying out the elements of Appellants’ claims and what must be shown to
prove antitrust liability in a class action context”).
81 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
82 Id. at 561. Even though “the standing inquiry [is] focused on whether the party invoking jurisdiction
had the requisite stake in the outcome when the suit was filed,” “the proof required to establish standing
increases as the suit proceeds.” Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008).
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successive stages of the litigation.”83 Thus, while “[a]t the pleading stage,
general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct
may suffice,” the elements of standing “must be ‘supported adequately by the
evidence adduced at trial.’”84 Because the elements of Article III standing must
be proven at trial—both as to the named plaintiffs and absent class members—
determining whether a class can be certified should incorporate an assessment
of whether the need to establish standing for all plaintiffs at trial will entail
individualized inquiries that preclude classwide adjudication.
Although it recognized that Article III applies to absent class members, the
Second Circuit in Denney viewed the interaction between Article III and class
certification somewhat differently.85 Rather than focusing on the impact that
proving standing for absent class members would have on a class trial, the
court instead held that “no class may be certified that contains members
lacking Article III standing” and emphasized that the key inquiry was whether
a class could “be defined in such a way that anyone within it would have
standing.”86 The Second Circuit’s focus on the class definition was likely
driven by its belief that absent class members were not required to “submit
evidence of personal standing.”87 That view, however, is inconsistent with
Lujan’s instruction that the elements of Article III standing are “an
indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case” that must be proven with evidence at
trial.88 If the requirements of Article III apply to absent class members, and
Denney makes clear that they do, then evidence of their personal standing must
be adduced at trial.
While Denney’s framework for incorporating Article III into the class
certification analysis is in tension with Lujan, it is certainly true that courts
should not grant certification where evidence shows that the proposed class is
overbroad and would, if certified, include persons who have not suffered an
injury sufficient to establish standing under Article III. In that circumstance, it

83

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
Id. (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 115 n.31 (1979)).
85 See Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 263–64 (2d Cir. 2006).
86 Id. at 264. The Eighth Circuit adopted Denney’s definition-focused approach in Avritt v. Reliastar Life
Insurance Co., 615 F.3d 1023, 1034 (8th Cir. 2010).
87 Denney, 443 F.3d at 263. The fact that Denney involved a settlement class, in which there would be no
trial, may also have influenced its reasoning. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997)
(“Confronted with a request for settlement-only class certification, a district court need not inquire whether the
case, if tried, would present intractable management problems, for the proposal is that there be no trial.”
(citation omitted)).
88 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
84
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would be difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between injured and
uninjured class members in a classwide proceeding without engaging in
unmanageable individualized inquiries. In other words, a class definition that
includes uninjured persons who cannot be easily identified (and thus excluded
from the class definition) is unlikely to satisfy Rule 23’s requirements,
including commonality and predominance, or constitute a class whose proper
membership can be readily ascertained.89
Thus, although it overlooks a plaintiff’s burden to prove the elements of
Article III standing at trial for all class members, Denney’s definition-focused
approach will nonetheless often lead to the right answer. But the better
approach would be for courts assessing whether the requirements of Rule 23
are satisfied to simply treat the elements of standing like the elements of the
underlying cause of action at issue, and therefore consider whether classwide
adjudication is warranted in light of the plaintiff’s burden to satisfy both sets of
elements. This approach comports with the Supreme Court’s guidance in Lujan
that Article III standing is an “indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case”90 and
avoids creating a unique doctrine of standing, applicable only to class actions,
under which no “evidence of personal standing”91 is required for absent class
members.
CONCLUSION
Article III creates a fundamental constitutional limitation on the power of
federal courts. Expanding this power to allow uninjured plaintiffs to litigate
their claims in federal court solely because they are aggregated with others in a
class action would violate the Rules Enabling Act, Rule 82, and due process.
Absent class members should therefore be required to prove at trial that they
have standing under Article III, and at the class certification stage courts
should assess whether the need for all plaintiffs to prove the elements of
standing precludes classwide adjudication.

89 See Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 305 (3d Cir. 2013) (“If class members are impossible to
identify without extensive and individualized fact-finding or mini-trials, then a class action is inappropriate.”
(quoting Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 44 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that certification was
improper where “ascertainment of which putative class members” were injured “bristl[ed] with individual
questions”).
90 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
91 Denney, 443 F.3d at 263.

